Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

Cooperative spreading dynamics on complex networks is a hot topic in the field of network science. In this paper, we propose a strategy to immunize some nodes based on their degrees. The immunized nodes disable the synergistic effect of cooperative spreading dynamics. We also develop a generalized percolation theory to study the final state of the spreading dynamics. By using the Monte Carlo method, numerical simulations reveal that immunizing nodes with a large degree cannot always be beneficial for containing (...) cooperative spreading. For small values of transmission probability, immunizing hubs can suppress the spreading, while the opposite situation happens for large values of transmission probability. Furthermore, numerical simulations show that immunizing hubs increase the cost of the system. Finally, all numerical simulations can be well predicted by the generalized percolation theory. (shrink)

In the real world, individual resources are crucial for patients when epidemics outbreak. Thus, the coupled dynamics of resource diffusion and epidemic spreading have been widely investigated when the recovery of diseases significantly depends on the resources from neighbors in static social networks. However, the social relationships of individuals are time-varying, which affects such coupled dynamics. For that, we propose a coupled resource-epidemic dynamic model on a time-varying multiplex network to synchronously simulate the resource diffusion and epidemic spreading in dynamic (...) social networks. The equilibrium analysis of the coupled model is conducted in a general scenario where the resource generation varies between susceptible and infected states and the recovery rate changes between resourceful and noresource states. By using the microscopic Markov chain approach and Monte Carlo simulations, we determine a probabilistic framework of the intralayer and interlayer dynamic processes of the coupled model and obtain the outbreak threshold of epidemic spreading. Meanwhile, the experimental results show the trivially asymmetric interactions between resource diffusion and epidemic spreading. They also indicate that the stronger activity heterogeneity and the larger contact capacity of individuals in the resource layer can more greatly promote resource diffusion, effectively suppressing epidemic spreading. However, these two individual characters in the epidemic layer can cause more resource depletion, which greatly promotes epidemic spreading. Furthermore, we also find that the contact capacity finitely impacts the coupled dynamics of resource diffusion and epidemic spreading. (shrink)

Although canine identification of body odor (BO) has been widely used as forensic evidence, the concept of nosewitness identification by human observers was only recently put to the test. The results indicated that BOs associated with male characters in authentic crime videos could later be identified in BO lineup tests well above chance. To further evaluate nosewitness memory, we assessed the effects of lineup size (Experiment 1) and retention interval (Experiment 2), using a forced-choice memory test. The results showed that (...) nosewitness identification works for all lineup sizes (3, 5, and 8 BOs), but that larger lineups compromise identification performance in similarity to observations from eye- and earwitness studies. Also in line with previous eye- and earwitness studies, but in disagreement with some studies on odor memory, Experiment 2 showed significant forgetting between shorter retention intervals (15 min) and longer retention intervals (1-week) using lineups of five BOs. Altogether this study shows that identification of BO in a forensic setting is possible and has limits and characteristics in line with witness identification through other sensory modalities. (shrink)

Chronic migraine is a difficult disease to diagnose, and its pathophysiology remains undefined. Its symptoms affect the quality of life and daily living tasks of the affected person, leading to momentary disability. This is a pilot, randomized, controlled, double-blind clinical trial study with female patients between 18 and 65 years old with chronic migraine. The patients underwent twelve mindfulness sessions paired with anodal transcranial direct-current stimulation over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, with current intensity of 2 mA applied for 20 (...) min, three times a week for 4 weeks. In addition, 20 min of mindfulness home practices were performed by guided meditation audio files. A total of 30 participants were evaluated after the treatment, and these were subdivided into two groups—active tDCS and sham tDCS, both set to mindfulness practice. The FFMQ-BR, MIDAS, and HIT-6 questionnaires were used to evaluate the outcomes. After the treatment, the active mindfulness and tDCS group showed better results in all outcomes. The sham group also showed improvements, but with smaller effect sizes compared to the active group. The only significant difference in the intergroup analysis was the outcome evaluated by HIT-6 in the post treatment result. Our results provide the first therapeutic evidence of mindfulness practices associated with left DLPFC anodal tDCS with a consequent increase in the level of full attention and analgesic benefits in the clinical symptoms of patients with chronic migraine. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary essay looks at the use of popular history for the critical understanding of the reconstruction of crime and patriarchal hierarchy. By way of reviewing the recent movie The Limehouse Golem, it illustrates the significance of theoretically engaging with a period crime fiction movie. It is argued that this assessment is less relevant in terms of producing historical understanding. Rather historical fiction reveals instead our own contemporary cultural fixations.

Quantum gravity poses the problem of merging quantum mechanics and general relativity, the two great conceptual revolutions in the physics of the twentieth century. The loop and spinfoam approach, presented in this book, is one of the leading research programs in the field. The first part of the book discusses the reformulation of the basis of classical and quantum Hamiltonian physics required by general relativity. The second part covers the basic technical research directions. Appendices include a detailed history of the (...) subject of quantum gravity, hard-to-find mathematical material, and a discussion of some philosophical issues raised by the subject. This fascinating text is ideal for graduate students entering the field, as well as researchers already working in quantum gravity. It will also appeal to philosophers and other scholars interested in the nature of space and time. (shrink)

Facts happen at every interaction, but they are not absolute: they are relative to the systems involved in the interaction. Stable facts are those whose relativity can effectively be ignored. In this work, we describe how stable facts emerge in a world of relative facts and discuss their respective roles in connecting quantum theory and the world. The distinction between relative and stable facts resolves the difficulties pointed out by the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner, and is consistent with (...) the experimental violation of the Local Friendliness inequalities of Bong et al.. Basing the ontology of the theory on relative facts clarifies the role of decoherence in bringing about the classical world and solves the apparent incompatibility between the ‘linear evolution’ and ‘projection’ postulates. (shrink)

Is reality three-dimensional and becoming real (Presentism), or is reality four-dimensional and becoming illusory (Eternalism)? Both options raise difficulties. I argue that we do not need to be trapped by this dilemma. There is a third possibility: reality has a more complex temporal structure than either of these two naive options. Fundamental becoming is real, but local and unoriented. A notion of present is well defined, but only locally and in the context of approximations.

This article argues that political realists have at least two strategies to provide distinctively political normative judgements that have nothing to do with morality. The first ground is instrumental normativity, which states that if we believe that something is a necessary means to a goal we have, we have a reason to do it. In politics, certain means are required by any ends we may intend to pursue. The second ground is epistemic normativity, stating that if something is true, this (...) gives us a reason to believe it. In politics, there are certain empirical regularities that ought to be acknowledged for what they are. Both sources are flawed. Instrumental normativity only requires coherence between attitudes and beliefs, and one can hang on to false beliefs to preserve attitudes incompatible with reality. I may desire to eschew power relations, and accordingly I may imagine politics to be like a camping trip. Epistemic normativity, on the other hand, operates critically, striking down existing normative claims. It shows us that politics is nothing like a camping trip, but it doesn’t tell us what we should do about it. We conclude by showing that if the two are taken together, they remedy each other’s flaws. (shrink)

Many moral philosophers have criticized intensive animal farming because it can be harmful to the environment, it causes pain and misery to a large number of animals, and furthermore eating meat and animal-based products can be unhealthful. The issue of industrially farmed animals has become one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time. On the one hand, utilitarians have argued that we should become vegetarians or vegans because the practices of raising animals for food are immoral since they (...) minimize the overall happiness. Deontologists, on the other hand, have argued that the practices of raising animals for food are immoral because animals have certain rights and we have duties toward them. Some virtue ethicists remain unconvinced of deontic and consequentialist arguments against the exploitation of animals and suggest that a virtue-based approach is better equipped to show what is immoral about raising and using animals for food, and what is virtuous about ethical veganism. (shrink)

In this paper I unpack a realistic conception of politics by tightly defining its constitutive features: conflict and order. A conflict emerges when an actor is disposed to impose his/her views against the resistance of others. Conflicts are more problematic than moralists realize because they emerge unilaterally, are potentially violent, impermeable to content-based reason, and unavoidable. Order is then defined as an institutional framework that provides binding collective decisions. Order is deemed necessary because individuals need to cooperate to survive, but (...) groups cannot spontaneously secure collective decisions and are prone to conflicts. Particularly, the fact that potentially violent conflicts emerge unilaterally means that order requires coercion. I conclude that mischaracterizing conflict and order leads to undesirable normative principles, and that this criticism can be leveraged not only against Rawlsian liberals who moralize conflicts away, but also against some agonists who underestimate the need for order and some communitarians who underplay both circumstances. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is not about 'quantum states': it is about values of physical variables. I give a short fresh presentation and update on the *relational* perspective on the theory, and a comment on its philosophical implications.

We discuss the principles for a primitive, object-linguistic notion of consequence proposed by ) that yield a version of Curry’s paradox. We propose and study several strategies to weaken these principles and overcome paradox: all these strategies are based on the intuition that the object-linguistic consequence predicate internalizes whichever meta-linguistic notion of consequence we accept in the first place. To these solutions will correspond different conceptions of consequence. In one possible reading of these principles, they give rise to a notion (...) of logical consequence: we study the corresponding theory of validity by showing that it is conservative over a wide range of base theories: this result is achieved via a well-behaved form of local reduction. The theory of logical consequence is based on a restriction of the introduction rule for the consequence predicate. To unrestrictedly maintain this principle, we develop a conception of object-linguistic consequence, which we call grounded consequence, that displays a restriction of the structural rule of reflexivity. This construction is obtained by generalizing Saul Kripke’s inductive theory of truth. Grounded validity will be shown to satisfy several desirable principles for a naïve, self-applicable notion of consequence. (shrink)

Testable predictions of quantum mechanics are invariant under time reversal. But the evolution of the quantum state in time is not so, neither in the collapse nor in the no-collapse interpretations of the theory. This is a fact that challenges any realistic interpretation of the quantum state. On the other hand, this fact raises no difficulty if we interpret the quantum state as a mere calculation device, bookkeeping past real quantum events.

In his 1956 book ‘The Direction of Time’, Hans Reichenbach offered a comprehensive analysis of the physical ground of the direction of time, the notion of physical cause, and the relation between the two. I review its conclusions and argue that at the light of recent advances in physics Reichenbach analysis provides the best account for the physical underpinning of these notions. I integrate results in cosmology, and on the physical underpinning of records and agency into Reichenbach’s account, and discuss (...) which questions it leaves open. (shrink)

A solution to the issue of time in quantum gravity is proposed. The hypothesis that time is not defined at the fundamental level (at the Planck scale) is considered. A natural extension of canonical Heisenberg-picture quantum mechanics is defined. It is shown that this extension is well defined and can be used to describe the "non-Schrödinger regime," in which a fundamental time variable is not defined. This conclusion rests on a detailed analysis of which quantities are the physical observables of (...) the theory; a main technical result of the paper is the identification of a class of gauge-invariant observables that can describe the (observable) evolution in the absence of a fundamental definition of time. The choice of the scalar product and the interpretation of the wave function are carefully discussed. The physical interpretation of the extreme "no time" quantum gravitational physics is considered. (shrink)

Truth-theoretic deflationism holds that truth is simple, and yet that it can fulfil many useful logico-linguistic roles. Deflationism focuses on axioms for truth: there is no reduction of the notion of truth to more fundamental ones such as sets or higher-order quantifiers. In this paper I argue that the fundamental properties of reasonable, primitive truth predicates are at odds with the core tenets of classical truth-theoretic deflationism that I call fix, express, and quantify. Truth may be regarded as a broadly (...) logical, sui generis notion. However, this has little to do with the original aims of the deflationary theory of truth. (shrink)

The book is a comprehensive introduction to the work of the Estonian-German biologist Jakob von Uexküll. After a first introductory chapter by Morten Tønnessen and a second chapter on Uexküll's life and philosophical background, it contains four chapters devoted to the analysis of his main works; they are followed by a vast eighth chapter which deals with the influence Uexküll had on other philosophers and scientists, and by a conclusions focused on the possibility of updating Uexküll's work. The monograph combines (...) a careful reconstruction of the historical context in which the Uexküllian concepts emerged (the debate between mechanism and vitalism, contemporary scientific studies) and a thorough analysis of the philosophical contents of the Uexküllian views. As far as the key issue is concerned, Uexküll's notion of Umwelt refers to the perceptive and operative world which surrounds animal species; it is a subjective species-specific construction which provides living organisms with great security and behaviour stability. Moreover, the relationship that the animal carries out with its environment proves to be a complex system of semiotic interactions: its behaviour is not a set of mechanical reactions, but the result of a spontaneous attribution of meaning to the outside world, whose environmental elements are actively interpreted by the subject. The environment of animal species becomes a field of meaning, an exceedingly complex subjective elaboration; this can lessen the distance between animals and men, crediting both with the cognitive ability to grasp meanings and to use signs. (shrink)

According to Bohmian mechanics, we see the particle, not the pilot wave. But to make predictions we need to know the wave. How do we learn about the wave to make predictions, if we only see the particle? I show that the puzzle can be solved, but only thanks to decoherence.

Substructural logics and their application to logical and semantic paradoxes have been extensively studied. In the paper, we study theories of naïve consequence and truth based on a non-reflexive logic. We start by investigating the semantics and the proof-theory of a system based on schematic rules for object-linguistic consequence. We then develop a fully compositional theory of truth and consequence in our non-reflexive framework.

In the paper we investigate typed axiomatizations of the truth predicate in which the axioms of truth come with a built-in, minimal and self-sufficient machinery to talk about syntactic aspects of an arbitrary base theory. Expanding previous works of the author and building on recent works of Albert Visser and Richard Heck, we give a precise characterization of these systems by investigating the strict relationships occurring between them, arithmetized model constructions in weak arithmetical systems and suitable set existence axioms. The (...) framework considered will give rise to some methodological remarks on the construction of truth theories and provide us with a privileged point of view to analyze the notion of truth arising from compositional principles in a typed setting. (shrink)

Choice can be defined in thermodynamical terms, and shown to have a thermodynamic cost: choosing between a binary alternative at temperature T dissipates an energy $$E\ge kT\ln 2$$.

The existence of a close connection between results on axiomatic truth and the analysis of truth-theoretic deflationism is nowadays widely recognized. The first attempt to make such link precise can be traced back to the so-called conservativeness argument due to Leon Horsten, Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland: by employing standard Gödelian phenomena, they concluded that deflationism is untenable as any adequate theory of truth leads to consequences that were not achievable by the base theory alone. In the paper I highlight, (...) as Shapiro and Ketland, the irreducible nature of truth axioms with respect to their base theories. But, I argue, this does not immediately delineate a notion of truth playing a substantial role in philosophical or scientific explanations. I first offer a refinement of Hartry Field’s reaction to the conservativeness argument by distinguishing between metatheoretic and object-theoretic consequences of the theory of truth and address some possible rejoinders. In the resulting picture, truth is an irreducible tool for metatheoretic ascent. How robust is this characterizaton? I test it by considering: a recent example, due to Leon Horsten, of the alleged explanatory role played by the truth predicate in the derivation of Fitch’s paradox; an essential weakening of theories of truth analyzed in the first part of the paper. (shrink)

Since the crisis of Fordism, capitalism has been characterised by the ever more central role of knowledge and the rise of the cognitive dimensions of labour. This is not to say that the centrality of knowledge to capitalism is new per se. Rather, the question we must ask is to what extent we can speak of a new role for knowledge and, more importantly, its relationship with transformations in the capital/labour relation. From this perspective, the paper highlights the continuing validity (...) of Marx's analysis of the knowledge/power relation in the development of the division of labour. More precisely, we are concerned with the theoretical and heuristic value of the concepts of formal subsumption, real subsumption and general intellect for any interpretation of the present change of the capital/labour relation in cognitive capitalism. In this way, we show the originality of the general intellect hypothesis as a sublation of real subsumption. Finally, the article summarises key contradictions and new forms of antagonism in cognitive capitalism. (shrink)

The first book of NE is organised on the model of investigating definitions described in the second Book of the Posterior Analytics, although, of course, with some adaptation due to the subject matter. It first establishes if the object exists and looks for the meaning of the terms used in common language to indicate it, next considers some necessary qualities of the object and then concludes with a definition of the object. We find there a dialectical syllogism of definition, and (...) not the procedure in three steps described in NE VII 1, sometimes called 'the method of ethics'. In fact, the method described in NE VII 1 does not apply to the first book of the NE. Its relevance for the NE has been somehow exaggerated. (shrink)

The Conventionality of Simultaneity espoused by Reichenbach, Grunbaum, Edwards, and Winnie is herein extended to mechanics and electrodynamics. The extension is seen to be a special case of a generally covariant formulation of physics, and therefore consistent with Special Relativity as the geometry of flat space-time. Many of the quantities of classical physics, such as mass, charge density, and force, are found to be synchronization dependent in this formulation and, therefore, in Reichenbach's terminology, "metrogenic." The relationship of these quantities to (...) 4-vectors and their physical significance is discussed. (shrink)

Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano’s discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique which suggests that Brentano had more than a superficial familiarity with mathematics. Indeed, considering the authors and works quoted in his lectures, Brentano appears well-informed and quite interested in the mathematical research of his time. I specifically address his lectures here as there is much less to (...) be found about mathematics in his published works. Besides Brentano’s own work, it is quite remarkable to see that practically all of his better-known students sooner or later produced a work on the philosophy of mathematics. This also encourages the supposition not just of a common interest in the matter, but of a common theoretical core. All this prompts the question: Can we speak of a Brentanist philosophy of mathematics? (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss some of Maximilian de Gaynesford’s arguments regarding indexicals. Although I agree with his treatment of the first singular personal pronoun as a prototype of demonstrative expressions, I challenge his refusal to treat indexicals as complex demonstratives. To offer an alternative to this refusal I try to develop a common ground from different theories that consider indexicals as linguistic constructions that embed a nonlinguistic element, following an original idea in Frege’s latest writings. These views form the (...) backdrop on which we can put forward the claim of treating all indexicals as complex demonstratives. In the central part of the paper, I criticize each of de Gaynesford’s arguments against the reduction of indexicals to complex demonstratives. Besides, I propose a new definition of the concept of “demonstration” as a nonlinguistic feature of all indexicals in their referential uses, to contrast de Gaynesford’s rejection of the idea that demonstrations are an essential feature of indexicals. Eventually, I strengthen my claim by distinguishing indexicals from proper names and definite descriptions on the ground that only perceptual indexicals necessarily require an accompanying demonstration. However, the main point of the paper is a negative one, that is the rejection of de Gaynesford’s arguments against the reduction of indexicals to complex demonstratives. More work is needed to reach a positive conclusion on this topic. (shrink)

The article examines the development of Husserl’s early philosophy from his Habilitationsschrift to the Philosophie der Arithmetik . An attempt will be made at reconstructing the lost Habilitationsschrift . The examined sources show that the original version of the Habilitationsschrift was by far broader than the printed version, and included most topics of the PA. The article contains an extensive and detailed comparison of these texts to illustrate the changes in Husserl’s position before and after February 1890. This date is (...) taken as a turning point in his development, because of Husserl’s announcement in a letter to Carl Stumpf that he was mistaken in his basic assumption, i.e. that the analysis of the concept of Anzahl would yield a foundation for arithmetic. Some interesting conclusions in this respect can also be drawn from an unpublished lecture that Husserl held in the WS 1889/90, in which he anticipates aspects of his position hitherto deemed to belong to the last phases of the PA. (shrink)

In the last few decades there has been a revival of interest in diagrams in mathematics. But the revival, at least at its origin, has been motivated by adherence to the view that the method of mathematics is the axiomatic method, and specifically by the attempt to fit diagrams into the axiomatic method, translating particular diagrams into statements and inference rules of a formal system. This approach does not deal with diagrams qua diagrams, and is incapable of accounting for the (...) role diagrams play as means of discovery and understanding. Alternatively, this paper purports to show that the view that the method of mathematics is the analytic method is capable of dealing with diagrams qua diagrams, and of accounting for such role. (shrink)

The so-called “intentional object” occupies a central position in the debates about intentionality in Brentano and the Brentano School. How does it relate to the correlate, the content, or the intended, possibly external, transcendent object? Does it perhaps even coincide with one of these? There was no clear consensus on this neither in Brentano’s time nor today. In order to develop a new perspective on the problem of the intentional object, I would like to introduce a deliberately radical interpretation and (...) related terminological change: what if we were to avoid any talk of “object” in this context altogether? Perhaps this could help avoid the ambiguities and misunderstandings associated with talk of “intentional objects.” In my contribution I would like to sketch such an interpretation and consider whether this attempt could be useful to reframe the debate. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between contextual work-related factors on the one hand, in terms of job demands (i.e., risk factors) and job resources (i.e., protective factors), and work-family conflict in teachers on the other. Building on the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model, we hypothesized that job demands, namely qualitative and quantitative workload, are positively associated with work-family conflict in teachers. Moreover, in line with the buffer hypothesis of the JD-R, we expected job resources, in terms (...) of support from supervisor, job autonomy, and participation in decision making, to affect this association, which is expected to be stronger when job resources are low. The study was conducted in an Italian secondary school. Overall, 122 teachers completed a self-report questionnaire aimed at determining work-family conflict, as well as job demands and resources. The hypothesized relationships were tested using moderated multiple regression. The results of this study largely support our predictions. First, both aspects of workload were positively associated with work-family conflict. Secondly, job resources, including support from supervisor and participation in decision making, buffered this association, which was stronger when resources were low. On the contrary, job autonomy did not buffer the association between workload and work-family conflict. Overall, the results of this study are consistent with the Job Demands-Resources model and contribute to to the understanding of work–family conflict among teachers. More specifically, our study suggests that teachers with high levels of job resources, namely support from supervisor and participation in decision making, can effectively cope with job demands, in terms of both qualitative and quantitative workload, thus preventing negative consequences such as conflict between work and family domains. Interventions aimed at preventing work-family conflict among teachers should encourage organizations to optimize the balance between job demands and resources, as well as the identification and training of the workers at risk of work-family conflict. (shrink)

Although in the past three decades interest in mathematical explanation revived, recent literature on the subject seems to neglect the strict connection between explanation and discovery. In this paper I sketch an alternative approach that takes such connection into account. My approach is a revised version of one originally considered by Descartes. The main difference is that my approach is in terms of the analytic method, which is a method of discovery prior to axiomatized mathematics, whereas Descartes’s approach is in (...) terms of the analytic–synthetic method, which is a heuristic pattern in already axiomatized mathematics. (shrink)

This volume is a broad anthology addressing many if not most major topics in phenomenology and philosophy in general: from foundational and methodological ...

Le terme archê dans l’ Éthique à Nicomaque III désigne le « principe » d’une chose au sens de ce qui a pouvoir sur elle, la cause motrice des actions. Ce pouvoir de domination est exprimé par l’expression eph’hêmin, et c’est Aristote qui l’introduit pour la première fois dans le débat sur la responsabilité morale. Les chapitres où il discute le concept d’ eph’hêmin sont clairement de nature dialectique, et son analyse se situe très probablement à l’intérieur d’un débat académique (...) sur ces thèmes, dont on trouve des traces dans les Lois. Les disciples de Platon pouvaient trouver des difficultés à comprendre les thèses de Platon sur le rapport entre action et caractère, et Aristote propose une solution originale, fondée sur sa théorie des quatre causes. Contre Platon, il refuse de rejeter la responsabilité des actions et du caractère mauvais sur la cité et les éducateurs, et place l’origine du caractère dans les actions et les choix de l’individu. Avec ce choix, Aristote élargit le problème de la responsabilité humaine de la question traditionnelle de savoir si les méchants sont responsables de leurs mauvaises actions au problème général de la responsabilité de toutes les actions, bonnes ou mauvaises. (shrink)

In the article Husserl’s view of the infinite around 1890 is analysed. I give a survey of his mathematical background and other important influences (especially Bolzano). The article contains a short exposition on Husserl's distinction between proper and symbolic presentations in the "Philosophie der Arithmetik" and between finite and infinite symbolic collections. Subsequently Husserl’s conception of surrogate presentations in his treatise "Zur Logik der Zeichen (Semiotik)" is discussed. In this text Husserl gives a detailed account of infinity, using surrogate presentations. (...) The conclusion is that with surrogates we can only operate according to blind psychological rules. (shrink)

One way to study and understand the notion of truth is to examine principles that we are willing to associate with truth, often because they conform to a pre-theoretical or to a semi-formal characterization of this concept. In comparing different collections of such principles, one requires formally precise notions of inter-theoretic reduction that are also adequate to compare these conceptual aspects. In this work I study possible ways to make precise the relation of conceptual equivalence between notions of truth associated (...) with collections of principles of truth. In doing so, I will consider refinements and strengthenings of the notion of relative truth-definability proposed by Fujimoto (2010): in particular I employ suitable variants of notions of equivalence of theories considered in Visser (2006) and Friedman & Visser (2014) to show that there are better candidates than mutual truth-definability for the role of sufficient condition for conceptual equivalence between the semantic notions associated with the theories. In the concluding part of the paper, I extend the techniques introduced in the first and show that there is a precise sense in which ramified truth (either disquotational or compositional) does not correspond to iterations of comprehension. (shrink)

The sixth century -- Anaximander's contributions -- Atmospheric phenomena -- Earth floats in space, suspended in the void -- Invisible entities and natural laws -- Rebellion becomes virtue -- Writing, democracy, and cultural crossbreeding -- What is science? -- Between cultural relativism and absolute thought -- Can we understand the world without Gods? -- Prescientific thought.

In this article I will begin by discussing recent criticism, by Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer, of the ontological interpretation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality, as formulated by i.a. Roderick Chisholm. I will then outline some apparent inconsistencies of the positions advocated by Antonelli and Sauer with Brentano’s formulations of his theory in several works and lectures. This new evaluation of (unpublished) sources will then lead to a sketch of a new approach to Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it (...) will be argued that the notion of “intentional object” is inherently and un- avoidably ambiguous in every act of external perception, due to the fact that we can only have improper intentions directed at the external world. (shrink)

Translator's Introduction: Hans-Georg Gadamer first published this essay in 1991 in his Gesammelte Werke, but it appeared shortly before in a Gedenkschrift for Karl-Heinz Ilting, a scholar of German Idealism and ancient philosophy who studied under Gadamer’s colleague, Erich Rothacker. The essay is the product of a lifetime of studies in Plato and Aristotle, reflecting in particular Gadamer’s ongoing preoccupation with the “Socratic question” and the development of his views on it since his Habilitationsschrift, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics . The Socratic (...) question consists of two intertwined questions: what is the good thing to do in a particular situation; and what is the human good. The latter question is the subject of philosophical ethics and motivates the thought of both Plato and Aristotle. As Gadamer argues here, but more extensively in The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy , both thinkers see this question of the good as grounded in the relat .. (shrink)